We propose a novel nonparametric method to empirically identify economies of scale in multiperson household consumption. We assume consumption technologies that define the public and private nature of expenditures through Barten scales. Our method (solely) exploits preference information revealed by a cross-section of household observations while accounting for fully unobserved preference heterogeneity. An application to data drawn from the PSID shows that the method yields informative results on scale economies and intrahousehold allocation patterns. In addition, it allows us to define individual compensation schemes required to preserve the same consumption level in case of marriage dissolution or spousal death.
the consumption shares of husbands and wives in alternative household types? What is the income compensation a woman should receive to guarantee the same material well-being after her husband passed away? How should this compensation vary with the number of dependent children? How relevant are scale economies for the assessment of inequality and poverty at the level of individual household members?
In the current paper, we propose a structural method to empirically identify economies of scale in household consumption. Our method recovers the consumption technology by solely exploiting preference information revealed by households' consumption behavior. We assume a household consumption model that has three main components. First, we follow Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 ) by assuming collective households that consist of individuals with heterogeneous preferences, who reach Pareto efficient intrahousehold allocations. Second, we adopt the framework of Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2013) and use Barten scales to define the public versus private nature of the goods consumed by the household (see also Barten, 1964, and Muellbauer, 1977) . Finally, we exploit marriage market implications to identify households' scale economies. Particularly, we use stability of observed marriages as our key identifying assumption. Our empirical application will show that assuming marital stability significantly benefits the identification results. In this respect, our analysis fits within the economics perspective on marriage that was initiated by Becker (1973, 1974) and Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) . These authors argue that individuals behave as rational utility maximizers when choosing their partners on the marriage market. We exploit this argument empirically and use the observed marital decisions to learn about the underlying individual preferences, household technologies and intrahousehold allocations, while explicitly accounting for economies of scale.
sumption of preference similarity is often regarded to be overly restrictive. 1 Our methodological extension of Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2017) is particularly relevant from a practical perspective. Admittedly, some data sets do contain fairly detailed information on the public and private nature of household consumption. See, for example, the Danish, Dutch and Japanese data that have been studied by, respectively, Bonke and Browning (2009), Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2012) and Lise and Yamada (2018) . However, the more frequently used data sets (like the one of our own application) typically do not contain this information. Moreover, the public and private nature of expenditures (e.g. on transportation and household work) is often difficult to define. This paper opens the possibility to exploit marital stability for the identification of within-household allocation patterns in such empirical settings.
To show its practical usefulness, we will apply our method to a cross-sectional household data set that is drawn from the 2013 wave of the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). In this application, households allocate their full income (i.e. the sum of both spouses' maximum labor income and nonlabor income) to both spouses' leisure, two commodities produced through the spouses' household work and the consumption of a Hicksian aggregate good. 2 We build on the 1 Given the overidentification of the basic model of Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2013) , there is room to parameterize preference changes due to marriage. Dunbar, Lewbel and Pendakur (2013) suggested an identification approach that no longer assumes that individuals in couples have the same preferences as singles. Their approach needs to assume either that preferences are similar across people for a given household type or, alternatively, that preferences are similar across household types for a given person. In our method, we account for fully unobserved preference heterogeneity across individuals in different households. 2 We implicitly consider two types of household technologies. The focus of this paper is on household technologiesà la Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2013) , which are associated with 5 00829 9
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology observation that household technologies are closely related to observable household characteristics. For example, it is often argued that the presence of children significantly impacts households' demand patterns (Browning, 1992) . For our own sample of households, we find that households' consumption patterns vary substantially depending on the number of children, age, education level and region of residence (see Appendix C.3).
Our novel methodology allows to investigate how these diverging consumption patterns relate to households' economies of scale and intrahousehold allocations. For example, what is the effect of children on public consumption in households? Does it matter whether or not the husband has a college degree? Is the pattern of intrahousehold consumption sharing different according to the region of residence or the age category? Should we model household work as fully publicly consumed or also as partly private? To meaningfully analyze these questions, we will assume that similar households (in terms of, e.g., age, education, or region of residence) operate on the same marriage market and are characterized by a homogeneous consumption technology. Our method then yields informative results on the nature of scale economies and intrahousehold allocation patterns for alternative household types. In turn, we can address the well-being questions that we mentioned above. As a specific illustration, we will discuss the possibility to compute individual compensation schemes required to preserve the same material well-being in case of marriage dissolution or spousal death. In addition, we can show the importance of explicitly accounting for scale economies and associated intrahousehold allocation patterns when assessing poverty at the individual level.
economies of scale. The other type of household technologies are related to the transformation of time spent on domestic work to commodities consumed inside the household in a Becker (1965) fashion. Under appropriate assumptions, a spouse's time spent on domestic production can serve as the output of the home produced good by this spouse. We will come back to this in Section 2.
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The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 introduces our notation and the structural components of our household consumption model. Section 3 formally defines our concept of stable marriage. Section 4 presents the testable implications of our model assumptions for observed household consumption patterns. Here, we will also indicate that these implications allow us to (set) identify households' economies of scale (i.e. Barten scales). Section 5 introduces the setup of our empirical application. Section 6 presents our empirical findings regarding economies of scale for our sample of households, and Section 7 the associated results on the intrahousehold allocation of resources. Section 8 provides some concluding discussion.
Household Consumption
We study households that consist of two decision makers, a male m and a female f . Our application will consider households that allocate their full income to spouses' leisure, household work and consumption of a Hicksian aggregate good. In what follows, we will provide more formal details on the household decision setting we have in mind. Subsequently, we will introduce our concept of consumption technology (with Barten scales). Finally, we will show how our set-up allows us to analyze households' economies of scale and intrahousehold allocation patterns.
Setting. We assume that each individual i ∈ {m, f } spends his or her total time (T ∈ R ++ ) on leisure (l i ∈ R + ), market work (m i ∈ R + ) and household work (h i ∈ R + ). The price of time for each individual is his or her wage (w i ∈ R ++ ) from market work. The time constraint for each
Let q m,f ∈ R is consumed inside the household (see Becker, 1965) . Under the assumption that each individual produces a different household good by means of an efficient one-input technology characterized by constant returns-to-scale, however, the individual's input value can serve as the output value.
Note that this implies specialization with respect to the production of household goods rather than specialization with respect to market work versus household work (see also Pollak and Wachter, 1975, and Pollak, 2013 ). We will return to the possibility of considering more sophisticated intrahousehold production technologies in the concluding Section 8.
Consumption decisions are made under budget constraints that are defined by prices and incomes. For any pair (m, f ), let y m,f ∈ R + denote the full potential income. Similarly, let y m,φ and y φ,f ∈ R + denote the full potential income of m and f when they are single. Further, let n m and n f ∈ R denote the nonlabor income of the two spouses. Specifically, we have:
Next, we let p m,f ∈ R K ++ represent the (row) vector of prices faced by the pair (m, f ), and
++ the (row) vectors of prices faced by m and f when they are single. In our application, the price of the Hicksian market good will be normalized at unity. The prices for leisure and household production will equal the observed individual wages. We will assume that individuals' wages are unaffected by marital status or spousal characteristics (i.e. there is no marriage premium or penalty), which implies that they remain the same as in the current marriage when individuals become single or remarry some other potential partner.
denote the spouses' private shares that satisfy the adding up constraint q
For a given consumption bundle q m,f , the household allocation is given by (q
exposition, we abstract from this extension in our current analysis. Moreover, for our identification method with the marital stability assumption, it can be argued that the wage rate inside marriage is probably a good benchmark when individuals compare their opportunity sets inside their current marriage and outside marriage as a single or with a different partner. 4 As discussed in the Introduction, our use of Barten scales to represent public versus private consumption follows Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2013) . In their theoretical discussion, these authors also considered a more general setting in which households buy the bundle v and consume the bundle x such that v = Bx + b, where B is a nonsingular matrix and b is a vector.
We discuss this more general setting in Appendix B. Our main empirical analysis will focus on a special case of this general type of linear household technologies. So far, we did not put any restriction on the technology matrix A. In our empirical application, we will assume that married couples which are observationally similar are characterized by the same degree of publicness of the consumed goods. We will do so by conditioning the value of A on observable household characteristics. In particular, we will assume that a household's consumption technology for matched couples can vary with the number of children in the household, the region of residence, and the age and education level of the husband. 5 As we discuss in Sections 6 and 7, this assumption is sufficient to obtain informative empirical results when using cross-sectional household data (containing only a single observation per individual household). In principle, if we used a panel household data set (with a time-series of observations for each household), then we could account for unobserved heterogeneity of the household technologies as well. We will briefly return to this point in our concluding discussion in Section 8.
Economies of scale. Publicness of consumption leads to economies of scale, which represent gains from marriage. Following Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2013), we quantify economies of scale from living together as the ratio of the (sum of) the expenditures that the male and female would need as singles to buy their consumption bundles within marriage (i.e. public and private quantities evaluated at the observed market prices), divided by the actual (observed) outlay of the household. Formally, for each matched pair (m, f ) we define the economies of scale measure
By construction, we will have that R m,f ∈ [1, 2] . If everything is consumed privately (i.e. a k = 0 for all k), then R m,f will equal 1, which means that there are no economies of scale. At the other extreme, if all goods are consumed entirely publicly (i.e. a k = 1 for all k), then R m,f equals 2 . If the household is characterized by both public and private consumption, then R m,f will be strictly between 1 and 2. Generally, our measure of scale economies quantifies a household's gains from sharing consumption. To take a specific example, let us assume that the measure equals 1.30
for some household. This means that the two individuals together would need 30% more income as singles to buy exactly the same aggregate bundle as in the household.
At this point, it is useful to remark that our scale economies measure R m,f is close in spirit to the popular equivalence scale concept, which aims at quantifying the cost for a household with given size and composition to achieve the same living standard as some reference household. For instance, if a single adult household needs x dollars to reach a given standard of living, and the corresponding equivalence scale for a household with two adults and one child is 2.2, then this last household needs 2.2x dollars to achieve the same living standard. Similar to our scale economies concept, equivalence scales capture the basic idea that households with multiple members benefit from consumption sharing. In our example, the three-member household needs less than 3x to reach the same standard of living as the one-member household. Equivalence scales are often used to address policy relevant questions related to poverty, inequality, the cost of children, the income compensation for spousal death or alimony rights, to name only a few.
However, the conceptual underpinnings of the equivalence scale concept are arguably very weak (see, for example, Chiappori, 2016 of (unobservable) heterogeneity. 6 Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2013) proposed the so-called indifference scale notion as a better grounded alternative to assess policy questions associated with household welfare. Indifference scales define the incomes that individuals would need to be equally well off (in utility terms) when living alone as in their current (multi-member) household.
In contrast to equivalence scales, indifference scales acknowledge the fact that individuals (and not households) have utilities. In addition, they naturally account for the presence of intrahousehold inequality. We will briefly return to the computation of indifference scales by using our nonparametric methodology in the concluding Section 8.
Intrahousehold allocation. In the current paper, we will analyze intrahousehold inequality through the male m's and female f 's "relative individual cost of equivalent bundle" (RICEB). 7 These measures are defined as follows:
The interpretation is similar to the scale economies measure R m,f . Specifically, these RICEBs capture the fractions of household expenditures that a male (female) would need as a single to achieve the same consumption level as under marriage at the new prices p m,φ (resp. p φ,f ). The 6 The scale economies measure that we use in the current study avoids these weaknesses and allows for heterogeneity across households. RICEBs also describe the allocation of expenditures to the male and female in a given household.
Given our particular setting, this allocation is defined by the household's economies of scale as well as the intrahousehold sharing pattern, which essentially reflects the individuals' bargaining positions. We will illustrate the importance of these two channels when interpreting the results for A final issue pertains to the prices p m,φ and p φ,f to be used for the absent spouse's household work in case one becomes a single. In our application, we will assume that exactly the same public good produced by the absent spouse will be bought on the market. Given the earlier dis-
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology cussed production technology, this implies that we can use this spouse's wage as the price for the household work that serves as an input in the production process. Sometimes other options may be available, though. More detailed information on the time use of spouses, for example, would make it possible to use market prices for marketable commodities like formal child care, cleaning the house or gardening. Our current data set only contains an aggregate of the spouses' time spent on household work, which rules out such an approach. Still, as a robustness check, we have redone our following empirical analysis by using the sample averages of female and male wages (instead of the current spousal wages) to define p m,φ and p φ,f . Reassuringly, this extra analysis yielded the same empirical conclusions (see Appendix E.1).
Marital Stability
We study a marriage market that consists of a finite set of males M and a finite set of females 
The current study will only consider married couples, i.e. σ(m) = φ for any m ∈ M and σ(f ) = φ for any f ∈ F (which implies |M | = |F |). In principle, it is relatively easy to include singles in our framework. However, our following application will show that our method gives informative results even if we do not use information on singles. Therefore, and also to simplify our 8 In our application, marriage stands for legal marriage as well as cohabitation.
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology exposition, we have chosen to only use couples' information in our main analysis. As a robustness check, in Appendix E.5 we show the results of an additional analysis based on a data set that also includes singles. This resulted in a qualitatively similar empirical analysis.
For a given matching function σ, the set S = {(q In what follows, we will say that a matching allocation S is stable if it is Pareto efficient, individually rational and has no blocking pairs. Essentially, this means that the allocation S belongs to the core of all possible marriage allocations. To formally define our stability criteria, we will assume that every individual i is endowed with a utility function
These utility functions are individual-specific (i.e. fully unobserved heterogeneity) and egoistic in the sense that each individual is assumed to get utility only from the own private and public consumption. We further assume that the utility functions for all individuals are non-negative, increasing, continuous and concave. Finally, we make the technical assumption that u i (0, Aq) = 0 (with Aq the public consumption), i.e. each individual needs at least some private consumption (e.g. food) to achieve a positive utility level.
Pareto Efficiency. We assume that households make Pareto efficient decisions (following Chiappori, 1988 Chiappori, , 1992 . Pareto efficiency requires for every matched pair that the intrahousehold consumption allocation admits no Pareto improvement for the given budget constraint. In other words, there does not exist another feasible allocation that makes at least one spouse strictly better off without making the other spouse strictly worse off. Formally, the matching allocation S is Pareto efficient if, for any pair (m, σ(m)), there does not exist any other feasible allocation
with at least one strict inequality.
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Individual rationality. Using the definition of Gale and Shapley (1962) , marital stability imposes that marriage matchings satisfy the conditions of individual rationality and no blocking pairs.
Individual rationality requires that no individual wants to become single. That is, no married individual can achieve a higher utility as single than under their current marriage. To formalize this criterion, let U m m,φ and U f φ,f denote that maximum utility that m and f can achieve when single (for prices p m,φ and p φ,f and incomes y m,φ and y φ,f respectively), i.e.
The matching allocation S is individually rational if, for every m ∈ M and f ∈ F , we have
No blocking pairs. An unmatched pair (m, f ) is said to be a blocking one if both m and f are better off, with at least one of them strictly better off, when matched together than under their current marriages. Formally, the matching allocation S has no blocking pairs if for any m and f such that f = σ(m) there does not exist any feasible allocation (z
Revealed Preference Conditions
In what follows, we first specify the type of data set that we will use in our following application,
and we define what we mean by rationalizability by a stable matching. Subsequently, we will present our testable revealed preference conditions for a data set to be rationalizable. We will also 16 00829 9
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show that these conditions can be relaxed by accounting for divorce costs (e.g. representing unobserved aspects of match quality and/or irrational behavior). Our conditions are linear in unknowns, which makes them easy to use in practice. Finally, we will indicate how our conditions enable (set) identification of households' economies of scale and intrahousehold allocation patterns.
Rationalizability by a stable matching. We observe a data set D on males m ∈ M and females f ∈ F that contains the following information:
• the matching function σ,
• the consumption bundles (q m,σ(m) ) for all matched couples (m, σ(m)),
• the prices p m,f for all m ∈ M ∪ {φ} and f ∈ F ∪ {φ},
• total nonlabor incomes n m,σ(m) for all matched couples (m, σ(m)).
Obviously, to verify if a given marriage allocation is stable or not, the analyst needs to know who is married to whom (σ). Next, we observe the aggregate consumption demand (q m,σ(m) ) of the matched pairs (m, σ(m)) but not the associated intrahousehold allocation of this consumption.
Similarly, we do not observe the aggregate consumption demand of the unmatched pairs (m, f ) (with f = σ(m)). In our following conditions, we will treat the vector q m,f for f = σ(m) as an unknown variable representing the potential consumption of (m, f ). By contrast, we observe the prices for all decision situations, i.e. for observed marriages but also for unobserved singles and unobserved potential couples. We recall from Section 2 that the quantity vectors q m,f contain a Hicksian aggregate good and time spent on leisure as well as on household production and, correspondingly, the price vectors p m,f contain the price of the aggregate good (which we normalize at unity) and individual wages. Finally, for the observed/married couples (m, σ(m))
we use a consumption-based measure of total nonlabor income, i.e. nonlabor income equals reported consumption expenditures minus full income. Then, we treat individual nonlabor incomes 17 00829 9
as unknowns that are subject to the restriction that they must add up to the observed (consumptionbased) total nonlabor income, i.e. n m,σ(m) = n m + n σ(m) , and, for a given specification of the individual incomes n m and n σ(m) , we obtain the full incomes y m,f , y m,φ and y φ,f as in (1) .
We say that the data set D is rationalizable by a stable matching if there exist nonlabor incomes n m and n f (defining y m,f , y m,φ and y φ,f ), utility functions u m and u f , a K × K diagonal matrix A (with diagonal entries 0 ≤ a k ≤ 1) and individual quantities q Testable implications. We can now define testable conditions for rationalizability by a stable matching. The main innovative feature of our current set-up is that we consider that the public consumption of the matched couples could be represented by an unknown technology matrix A defining the public versus private nature of household expenditures. As motivated in the Introduction, this specific extension is particularly attractive from a practical perspective, as it opens the possibility to study data sets in which the public and private nature of household expenditures is unknown and/or hard to define.
Our testable conditions only use information that is contained in the data set D and do not require any (non-verifiable) functional structure on the within-household decision process, which minimizes the risk of specification error. In addition, the conditions avoid any preference homogeneity assumption for individuals in different households. Moreover, they use only a single consumption observation per household, which makes them applicable to cross-sectional household data sets. The conditions are stated in the next result. See Appendix A for the proof. 
(ii) and the no blocking pair restrictions
Interestingly, the testable implications in Proposition 1 are linear in the unknown technology matrix A, the nonlabor incomes n m and n σ(m) , and the individual quantities q This makes it easy to verify them in practice. The explanation of the different conditions is as follows. First, the proposition requires the construction of a technology matrix A of which the diagonal entries capture the degree of publicness in each consumption good, ranging from entirely private (a k = 0) to entirely public (a k = 1). Next, conditions (a) and (b) specify the adding up restrictions for matched couples that we discussed above, which pertain to the unknown individual nonlabor incomes and privately consumed quantities.
Further, conditions (i) and (ii) impose the individual rationality and no blocking pair restrictions that apply to a stable marriage allocation. They have intuitive revealed preference interpretations.
More specifically, condition (i) requires, for each individual male and female, that the total income 19 00829 9 from unobserved match quality (such as love or companionship). We have also abstracted from frictions on the marriage market and costs associated with marriage formation and dissolution.
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In our empirical application, we will follow Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen (2017) and include the possibility that these different aspects may give rise to costs of divorce, which makes that the observed consumption behavior (captured by the observed data set D) may violate the strict rationality requirements in Proposition 1. In particular, we make use of "stability indices" to weaken these strict constraints. Intuitively, these indices represent income losses 9 The expression max{q m,σ(m) , q σ(f ),f } represents the element-by-element maximum, i.e. q =
. We represent these post-divorce losses as percentages of potential labor incomes. 10 Alternatively, these indices can also be interpreted as quantifying how close the observed household behavior is to "exactly stable" behavior as characterized by the conditions in Proposition 1; they allow us to account for deviations from such exact stability in the empirical analysis. In that sense, the stability indices are similar in spirit to the nonparametric "goodness-of-fit" indices (interchangeably referred to as Critical Cost Efficiency Indices and Afriat Indices in the literature)
that Afriat (1972 Afriat ( , 1973 and Varian (1990) proposed in the context of revealed preference analysis.
Formally, starting from our characterization in Proposition 1, we include a stability index in each restriction of individual rationality (i.e. s 
and the inequality in condition (ii) of Proposition 1 by
We also add the restriction 0 ≤ s
Generally, a lower stability index corresponds to a greater income loss associated with a particular option to exit marriage. 10 We consider adjustment in labor incomes because nonlabor incomes are unknown variables in our conditions in Proposition 1. By only considering post-divorce adjustments of labor incomes, we preserve linearity in unknowns when treating the stability indices as unknown variables. This allows to use linear programming to compute these indices.
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subject to the feasibility conditions for the technology matrix A, the restrictions (a) and ( to rescale the original potential labor incomes (w m T , w f T and w m T + w f T ), which will define an adjusted data set that is rationalizable by a stable matching. For this new data set, we can address alternative identification questions by starting from our rationalizability conditions.
In the following sections, we will specifically focus on the scale economies measure R m,f in . As a result, we obtain our upper/lower bounds for these measures by maximizing/minimizing these linear functions subject to our linear rationalizability restrictions in Proposition 1. This effectively set identifies the households' economies of scale and intrahousehold allocation patterns, through linear programming. This set identification essentially only exploits marital stability as our key identifying assumption, without any further parametric structure for intrahousehold decision processes or homogeneity assumptions regarding individual preferences.
As a final remark, we note that the stability indices may also be seen as indicating an incentive to divorce. In that reasoning, divorce costs signal unstable marriages, which makes the assumption of marriage stability useless for the identification of intrahousehold decision processes. In our following empirical analysis, we will account for this concern by performing a robustness check, in which the empirical identification analysis only includes couples that do not require a divorce cost for any exit option to rationalize the observed household consumption. See our discussion in Appendices D.1 and E.2 for more details.
Empirical Application: Set-up
We consider households that spend their full income (i.e. potential labor income and nonlabor income) on a Hicksian aggregate market good, time for household production and time for leisure.
Our data set includes information on individuals' time use for household work and for leisure.
Apps and Rees (1997) and Donni (2008) have emphasized the importance of considering home production for identifying intrahousehold allocations and conducting individual welfare analysis.
Particularly, ignoring time spent on household production means that all time not spent on market labor will be considered as pure leisure. In such a case, an individual with low market labor supply (e.g. a part-time working mother) will be regarded as consuming a lot of leisure, even if 23 00829 9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in fact (s)he spends a large amount of time on home production (e.g. child care). In our model, we only associate (potential) economies of scale with consumption goods that have market substitutes; these scale economies can effectively be compensated in case of spousal death or marriage dissolution. As an implication, we allow the Hicksian market good and time spent on household production to be characterized by a public component, while time spent on leisure is modeled as purely private. In our empirical analysis, we focus on couples with or without children and no other family member living in the household. Because we need wage information, we only consider households in which both spouses work at least 10 hours per week on the labor market. 12 After removing 11 As a further robustness check, we also consider the scenario in which a fraction of leisure is allowed to be publicly consumed (reflecting externalities). Specifically, instead of assuming that all leisure is privately consumed, we now put upper bounds of 5, 10 and 15% on the degree of publicness of male and female leisure (i.e. we set A leisure ≤ 5%, 10% and 15%). Evidently, because this allows for more public consumption, our scale economies estimates and individual RICEBs generally increase, by construction. However, and importantly, the main qualitative conclusions of our empirical analysis remain intact (see Appendix E.3). 12 We see two possible approaches to account for spouses who are not active on the labor market.
Firstly, we could exogenously define the wage of the inactive spouses on the basis of their observ-24 00829 9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
observations with missing information (e.g. on time use) and outliers, we end up with a sample of 1322 households. 13 In Appendices C.1-C.3 we provide further information on our data set.
To implement the rationalizability restrictions in Proposition 1, we need to define the prices and incomes that apply to the different exit options from marriage (becoming single or remarrying).
In what follows, the price of individuals' time use (leisure and household work) equals their wage rate, and we will assume that wages are unaffected by marital status. This implies that we can use the observed wages as the price of own time use in any counterfactual situation. Next, for spousal household work, we use the wage rate of the potential spouse when evaluating the exit option of remarriage (in the no blocking pair restrictions) and the wage rate of the current spouse when evaluating the exit option of becoming single (in the individual rationality restrictions). 14 Further, able characteristics (like education and age). Secondly, we could use the method of Cherchye, De
Rock, Vermeulen and Walther (2017), and define shadow prices endogenously under the assumption of efficient household production and constant returns-to-scale. To simplify our discussion, we chose not to follow these approaches in the current paper. But the extensions are fairly easy. 13 We dropped 4429 households with an unmarried head of family. 2640 households were not considered because of missing information (mainly on individuals' education, time use and wages) and another 617 households had household members different from husband, wife and children.
Finally, we lost 55 households because of data trimming (leaving out the households in the 1st and 99th percentiles of the male and female wage distributions). 14 Vermeulen (2017), we exclude unrealistic scenarios by imposing that individual nonlabor incomes after divorce must lie between 40% and 60% of the total nonlabor income under marriage.
Marriage markets. As indicated above, we let household technologies vary with observable household characteristics (i.e. age, education, number of children and region of residence). We use the same observable characteristics to define households marriage markets. As an implication, while our analysis accounts for fully (unobservably) heterogeneous individual preferences (as explained before), we do consider that all potential couples on the same marriage market are characterized by a homogeneous consumption technology (defining the public versus private nature of goods). Thus, we specifically focus on marriage matchings on the basis of individuals preferences for the public and private goods that are consumed within the households, and we build on this premise to learn about the underlying household technology from the observed matchings.
Evidently, in real life individuals may well account for remarriage possibilities that are characterized by different technologies (for different household characteristics). In addition, they may lack of detailed information on the spouses' time use, we do not follow this route in the paper.
However, in Appendix E.1 we report on a robustness check in which we use the average wage of males and females in the sample to evaluate spousal domestic work in the counterfactual situation of singlehood.
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology also consider repartnering with other individuals who are currently single. Including information on these additional repartnering options would increase the number of potentially blocking pairs, and this can only improve our identification analysis. 15 From this perspective, our following empirical analysis adopts a "conservative" approach and only uses largely uncontroversial assumptions on individuals' remarriage options. We will show that even this minimalistic set-up leads to insightful empirical conclusions. In Appendices C.4-C.5 we discuss more in detail the construction of our marriage markets.
Economies of Scale
When checking the strict rationalizability conditions in Proposition 1, we found that our data satisfy these conditions for 69 out of the 128 marriage markets. For the remaining 59 markets, we computed the divorce costs that we need to rationalize the observed consumption and marriage behavior. As explained in Section 4, for each different exit option (i.e. becoming single or remarrying) this computes a minimal divorce cost that makes the observed data set consistent with the sharp restrictions in Proposition 1. These divorce costs can be interpreted in terms of unobserved aspects that drive (re)marriage decisions, such as imperfect rationality, match quality and frictions on the marriage markets.
As we discuss in detail in Appendix D.1, we only need to mildly adjust the post-divorce incomes to rationalize the observed consumption behavior in terms of a stable matching allocation.
Therefore we use the divorce costs summarized in Table 12 (in Appendix D.1) to construct a new 15 Technically, including additional blocking pair constraints will lead to smaller feasible sets characterized by the rationalizability constraints in Proposition 1. In turn, this will lead to sharper upper and lower bounds (i.e. tighter set identification). We illustrate this point in Appendix E.5, which presents a robustness analysis in which we also include singles as potentially blocking pairs.
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology data set that is rationalizable by a stable matching. 16 In turn, this allows us to set identify the decision structure underlying the observed stable marriage behavior. We begin by considering the upper and lower bound estimates for the scale economies measure R m,f in (2). In doing so, we will also consider the associated good-specific Barten scales (i.e. the diagonal entries of the household technology matrix A). In our application, these Barten scales capture the degree of publicness of spouses' household work and couples' consumption of market goods.
As a first step, we compare our estimated upper and lower bounds with so-called "naive"
bounds. These naive bounds do not make use of the (theoretical) restrictions associated with the assumption that marriage markets are stable. In this respect, we remark that the sole assumption of Pareto efficient intrahousehold allocations (without marital stability) imposes no empirical restriction on observed household consumption when allowing for fully heterogeneous individual preferences (see Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and Vermeulen, 2017). More specifically, the naive bounds are defined as follows. The lower bound corresponds to a situation in which A equals the zero matrix, which means that there is no public consumption at all. By contrast, the naive upper bound complies with the other extreme scenario in which spouses' household work and market goods are entirely publicly consumed, which corresponds to a value of unity for the diagonal elements of the matrix A. Note that the private consumption of leisure implies that this upper bound will in general be different from two, which would be the upper bound in case all commodities are purely publicly consumed. In what follows, we call the bounds that we obtain by our methodology "stable" bounds, as they correspond to a stable matching allocation on the marriage market. Comparing these stable bounds with the naive bounds will provide insight into the identifying power of our key identifying assumption, that is, stability of observed marriages. 16 As indicated before, in Appendix E.2 we present a robustness check in which we only focus on the couples for that satisfy the sharp restrictions. The results are qualitatively the same.
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The results of this comparison are summarized in Table 1 (Panel A) . 17 Columns 2-4 describe the bounds for R m,f that we estimate by our method, and columns 5-7 report on the associated naive bounds. We also give summary statistics on the percentage point differences between the (stable and naive) upper and lower bounds (see the "Difference" columns); these differences indicate the tightness of the bounds for the different households in our sample. To interpret these results, we recall that leisure is assumed to be fully privately consumed. However, as extensively discussed above, we do not impose any assumption regarding the public or private nature of the remaining expenditure categories (i.e. household work and market goods). Even under our minimalistic set-up, our identification method does yield informative results. Specifically, the average lower bound on R m,f equals 1.06 while the upper bound amounts to 1.18, corresponding to an average difference of only 12 percentage points. Importantly, these stable bounds are substantially tighter than the naive bounds. The naive lower bound is 1.00 by construction and the upper bound equals 1.36 on average, which implies a difference of no less than 36 percentage points. Moreover, for 50% of the observed households we obtain a difference of less than 3 percentage points, which is substantially tighter than for the naive bounds.
As a following exercise, Table 1 (Panel B) reports on our estimates of the diagonal entries a k (for each good k) of the technology matrix A that underlies the scale economies results in Table   1 . For the spouses' household work and the Hicksian market good, the "Min" columns 2, 5 and 8 correspond to the lower stable bounds in Table 1 , the "Max" columns 3, 6 and 9 to the upper stable bounds, and the "Avg" columns 4, 7 and 10 to the average of the Min and Max estimates. We note that the associated "naive" estimates of the a k -entries (underlying the naive bounds in Table   1 ) trivially equal 0 for the minimum scenario and 1 for the maximum scenario, by construction.
17 Appendix D.2 shows the empirical cumulative distribution of the stable upper and lower bounds on our scale economies measure R m,f . Table 1 again shows the informative nature of the bounds that we obtain. On average, there seems to be some difference in publicness of household work by females or by males: the respective lower bounds equal 0.25 and 0.14, and the associated upper bounds amount to 0.51 and 0.38.
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Interestingly, our results do reveal quite some variation across households: in some households all household work is privately consumed (i.e. the minimum value for the upper bound on a k equals 0), while in other households the consumption is fully public (i.e. the maximum value for the lower bound on a k equals 1).
Next, we find that the average a k -estimate for the Hicksian market good is situated between 0.15 (lower bound) and 0.47 (upper bound), which implies that the Barten scale for market goods The results in Table 1 show the potential of our identification method to obtain informative results, even if we make minimal assumptions regarding the data at hand. Moreover, our findings reveal quite some interhousehold heterogeneity in the patterns of scale economies. We investigate this further in Appendix D.3 by relating the estimates summarized in Table 1 US are characterized by more scale economies, while richer households generally experience less economies of scale.
Intrahousehold Allocation
As explained in Section 2, we can also use our methodology to calculate bounds on the male and female "relative individual costs of equivalent bundles" (RICEBs) R m m,f and R f m,f (see (3) and (4)).
Basically, these individual RICEBs quantify who consumes what relative to the household's full
income. In what follows, we will investigate these RICEBs in more detail, and this will provide specific insights into intrahousehold allocation patterns. We will also indicate how we can use these results to compute individual compensation schemes needed to preserve the same consumption level in case of marriage dissolution or spousal death. More generally, this illustrates the usefulness of our methodology to address the well-being questions that we listed in the Introduction.
RICEBs. Similar to before, we start by comparing the "stable" RICEB bounds, which we obtain through our identification method, with "naive" bounds. For a given individual, the naive lower bound equals the fraction of the budget share of the individual's leisure consumption (which is assignable and private), while the naive upper bound equals this lower bound plus the budget share of the household's non-leisure consumption (which is non-assignable). The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 2 . Like before, we also report on the percentage point differences between the (stable and naive) upper and lower bounds (see the "Diff" columns).
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Once more, we conclude that our method has substantial identifying power. lower bounds narrowing down from 36 percentage points (for the naive bounds) to no more than 9 to 11 percentage points (for the stable bounds). The stable bounds are also informatively tight. For example, we learn that, on average, males seem to have more control over household expenditures than females: the average male RICEB is situated between 55% and 64%, while the average female RICEB is only between 47% and 57%. Like before, however, there is quite some heterogeneity between households: lower bounds for females (resp. males) range from 2% to 92% (resp. 7% to 99%) and upper bounds from 5% to 96% (resp. 15% to 99%). Individual poverty. Our RICEB estimates allow us to conduct a poverty analysis directly at the level of individuals in households rather than at the level of aggregate households. Given our particular set-up, such a poverty analysis can simultaneously account for both economies of scale in consumption (through public goods) and within-household sharing patterns (reflecting individuals' 19 Recall that the lower bound of the RICEB and upper bound of the RICEB need not necessarily add up to unity. The reason is that these RICEBs divide the value of individual consumption by total household expenditures (see (3) and (4) bargaining positions). To clearly expose the impact of these two mechanisms, we perform three different exercises. In our first exercise, we compute the poverty rate defined in the usual way, i.e.
as the percentage of households having full income that falls below the poverty line, which we fix at 60% of the median full income in our sample of households. 20 This also equals the individual poverty rates if there would be equal sharing and no economies of scale. The results of this exercise are given in Table 3 under the heading "No economies of scale and equal sharing". We would label 12.48% of the individuals (and couples) as poor if we ignored scale economies and assumed that household resources are shared equally between males and females.
In a following exercise, we use the same household poverty line but now account for the possibility that household consumption exceeds the expenditures because of economies of scale. In particular, we increase the households' aggregate consumption levels by using the (lower and upper) scale economies estimates that we summarized in Table 1 . Again, we assume equal sharing within households. Then, we can compute lower and upper bounds on individual poverty rates while accounting for the specific impact of households' scale economies. We report these results under the heading "With economies of scale and equal sharing" in Table 3 . Not surprisingly, we see that poverty rates decrease when compared to the calculations that ignore intrahousehold scale economies; the estimated poverty rate is now between 5.14% (lower bound) and 10.89% (upper bound). 20 We remark that, while 60% of the median income is a standard measure of relative poverty (e.g. used in the definition of OECD poverty rates), in our case the poverty rate is calculated on the basis of full income instead of (the more commonly used) earnings or total expenditures. Also, our data set pertains to couples where both spouses participate in the labor market, and so our poverty line will be different from a line based on data that includes households with singles, unemployed or retired members. So far, we have computed poverty rates under the counterfactual of equal sharing within households. However, households typically do not split consumption perfectly equally. Therefore, in our third exercise, we compute poverty rates on the basis of our RICEB results summarized in Table   2 . Here, we label an individual as poor if his/her RICEB-based estimate falls below the individual poverty line, which we define as half of the poverty line for couples that we used above. Like before, we can compute upper and lower bound estimates for the individual poverty rates. The outcomes are summarized under the heading "With economies of scale and unequal sharing" in Table   3 . It is interesting to compare these results with the ones that account for scale economies but assume equal intrahousehold sharing. We conclude that unequal sharing considerably deteriorates the poverty rates, both for the males and the females in our sample. In particular females seems to suffer the most: the lower and upper rates of female poverty equal 11.72% and 24.06%, which is well above the upper bound of 10.89%. In Appendix D.6, we provide some further insights in these poverty rates by differentiating between households with different characteristics. It illustrates that our method can be used to analyze poverty differences between males and females depending on, e.g., the number of children or region of residence.
These results fall in line with the findings of Cherchye, De Rock, Lewbel and Vermeulen (2015) , who also showed that, due to unequal sharing of resources within households, the fraction of individuals living below the poverty line may be considerably greater than the fraction obtained by standard measures that ignore intrahousehold allocations. A main novelty of our analysis is that we also highlight the importance of households' scale economies in assessing individual poverty.
For some households/individuals, publicness of consumption may partly offset the negative effect of unequal sharing. As we have shown, our method effectively allows us to disentangle the impact of the two channels. 21 21 For the sake of brevity, we focused on the importance of economies of scale in assessing 
Conclusion
We have presented a novel structural method to empirically identify households' economies of scale that originate from public consumption (defined by Barten scales). We take it that these economies of scale imply gains from marriage, and use the observed marriage behavior to identify households' scale economies under the maintained assumption of marital stability. Our method is intrinsically nonparametric and requires only a single consumption observation per household. In addition, the method can be implemented through simple linear programming, which is attractive from a practical point of view. 22 Our method produces informative empirical results that give insight into the structure of scale economies for alternative household types. In turn, these findings can be used to address a variety of follow-up questions (e.g. on intrahousehold allocation patterns and individual income compensations in case of marriage dissolution or spousal death).
We have demonstrated alternative uses of our method through an empirical application to consumption data drawn from the PSID, for which we assume that similar households (in terms of age, education, number of children and region of residence) operate on the same marriage market and are characterized by a homogeneous consumption technology. We found that public consumption increases with the number of children living in the household, and that particularly households in individual poverty. However, our method would also allow us to investigate the role played by economies of scale and unequal sharing in assessing between and within-household consumption inequality (see e.g. Lise and Seitz, 2011 and Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov and Santos, 2014, 2016, for alternative methods and applications). 22 This linear programming structure can actually also be useful from an inferential point of view. For example, Kaido, Molinari and Stoye (2016) introduces a bootstrap-based procedure to do inference on the value of a linear program with estimated constraints. We see the adaptation of this work to our identification method as an interesting avenue for follow-up research.
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology the Northeast region of the US experience more economies of scale, while richer households are generally characterized by lower scale economies. Next, we have analyzed intrahousehold allocation patterns of expenditures by computing the "relative costs of equivalent bundles" (RICEBs) for the males and females in our sample, and we showed the relevance of these RICEBs for individual poverty analysis (revealing substantial inequalities between males and females in households with dependent children). We found that the individual RICEBs are significantly related to the intrahousehold wage ratio, the household's full income, the number of children, the interspousal age difference and the region of residence. As an implication, the same variables also impact the individual compensation schemes required to guarantee the same consumption level in case of marriage dissolution or wrongful death.
In our application, we have made a number of simplifying modeling choices. Weakening these assumptions can enrich the empirical investigation, and the insights that are drawn from it. For example, as we discussed in Section 2, we have assumed a fairly simple household production setting, in which each individual produces a single domestic good. An interesting avenue for follow-up research consists of including more sophisticated production processes, in which the domestic goods are produced by the two spouses simultaneously. See, for example, Goussé, Jacquemet and Robin (2017), who also consider a marriage matching context. By extending our methodology to also identify such a more complicated within-household production structure, we will obtain a toolkit that can empirically address research questions related to, for example, marriage matching on productivity and specialization in marriage. Such an extension can also provide a fruitful ground to explicitly include the (welfare of) children in the structural identification analysis. Next, because our method uses information on individual wages, we have restricted our analysis to couples in which both partners are active on the labor market. Obviously, an interesting further development consists of including couples with inactive partner(s) (and unobserved wage(s)). In such instances, 39 00829 9
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we can proceed by using shadow wages, which can also be identified on the basis of a structural household production model. For example, following a similar nonparametric approach, Cherchye,
De Rock, Vermeulen and Walther (2017) showed how to infer shadow prices under the assumption of efficient household production and constant returns-to-scale. Clearly, integrating these insights in our methodological framework would significantly widen the range of empirical questions that can be addressed.
At the empirical level, a specific feature of our analysis is that we used only a single consump- can be used to compute Hicksian-type income compensations (i.e. for fixed utility levels) in case of divorce or spousal death, which constitute useful complements to the (Slutsky-type) RICEBbased compensations (with fixed consumption levels) that we considered in the current study. In addition, the use of household-specific time-series could also allow us to relax our assumption that observationally similar households are characterized by a homogeneous consumption technology, and thus to account for unobserved heterogeneity of the household technologies.
Finally, to operationalize the no blocking pairs condition in our empirical method we need to define individuals' marriage markets. As discussed in Section 3, our empirical application adopted 40 00829 9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology a minimalistic approach by focusing on small marriage markets containing observationally similar households. In addition, our results appeared to be robust for the assumption that individuals consider only a subset of the potential partners in the marriage markets that we constructed. Still,
we do see a more refined modeling of individuals' marriage markets as a useful extension of the method that we proposed in the current paper. Intuitively, this boils down to constructing individual-specific "consideration sets" for the particular context of marital matching. 23 Such a construction may use insights from the literature on structurally explaining observed marriage patterns (see, for example, Choo and Siow, 2006 , and, more recently, Dupuy and Galichon, 2014).
